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Abstract
Manipulation and re-use of images in scientific publications is a concerning problem that
currently lacks a scalable solution. Current tools for detecting image duplication are mostly
manual or semi-automated, despite the availability of an overwhelming target dataset for a
learning-based approach. This paper addresses the problem of determining if, given two im-
ages, one is a manipulated version of the other by means of copy, rotation, translation, scale,
perspective transform, histogram adjustment, or partial erasing. We propose a data-driven
solution based on a 3-branch Siamese Convolutional Neural Network. The ConvNet model is
trained to map images into a 128-dimensional space, where the Euclidean distance between du-
plicate images is smaller than or equal to 1, and the distance between unique images is greater
than 1. Our results suggest that such an approach has the potential to improve surveillance of
the published and in-peer-review literature for image manipulation.
Keywords: siamese network, similarity metric, image forensics, image manipulation.
Project page: https://hms-idac.github.io/ImageForensics/
1 Introduction
Duplicative data reporting in the biomedical literature is more prevalent than most people are aware
[1]. One common form of data duplication, regardless of intent, is the re-use of scientific images,
across multiple publications or even within the same publication. In some cases, images are altered
before being re-used [1]. Changing orientation, perspective or image statistics, introducing skew
or crop, and deleting or inserting data into the original image plane are all ways in which image
data may be altered prior to inappropriate introduction, or re-introduction, into the reporting of
experimental outcomes [10, 4, 2]. While the scientific community has affirmatively recognized the
need for preventing the incorporation of duplicative or flawed image data into the scientific record,
a consistent approach to screening and identifying problematic image data has yet to be established
[8, 9].
Cases of image data duplication and/or manipulation have often been detected by fellow scien-
tists1 or by editorial staff during the manuscript review process. Efforts to move towards automation
∗Alphabetical order. MC, HE and DR affiliated with the Image and Data Analysis Core; DW and MW with the
Office for Academic and Research Integrity.
1E.g.: http://retractionwatch.com/, https://pubpeer.com/, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clare Francis (science critic)
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include tools developed to isolate regions of manipulation within images already flagged as suspi-
cious [7]. However, current methods for identifying duplicative and/or manipulated images largely
rely on individual visual identification with accompanying application of qualitative similarity mea-
sures 2. Given the rate at which the scientific literature is expanding, it is not feasible for all cases
of potential image manipulation to be detected by human eyes. Thus, there is a continued need
for automated tools to detect potential duplications, even in the presence of manipulation, to allow
for more focused, thorough evaluation of this smaller errant image candidate pool. Such a tool
would be invaluable to scientists and research staff on many levels, from figure screening as a step
in improving raw data maintenance and manuscript preparation at the laboratory level [10], to
the routine screening by journal editorial staff of submitted manuscripts prior to the peer-review
process [8, 5].
The general problem of detecting similar images has been well studied in the field of computer
vision. For example, the challenge of determining if two images contain the same human subject,
despite large changes in orientation and lighting, is closely related to the problem we wish to
address. Recent breakthroughs in deep Convolutional Neural Networks (ConvNets) have driven
rapid progress in this area [11].
In this paper, we apply modern methods in facial recognition to address the problem of detecting
image manipulation and re-use in scientific work. Specifically, we train a ConvNet to learn an image
embedding, such that images with the same original content, albeit manipulated through a common
set of image manipulations, appear close to each other in the embedding space. We train this model
on a large corpus of simulated image manipulations, and test on a small set of 54 manipulated
images from known instances of image duplication/manipulation 3. To our knowledge, this is the
first application of deep learning to the detection of image re-use in the scientific literature.
An overview of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we review methods for image similarity based
on deep learning that influenced this work. In Subsection 3.1, we present the model architecture
that is trained for image embedding. In Subsection 3.2, we discuss the triplet loss function used to
train the model. In Subsection 3.3, we describe how we generated a large training set of simulated
image manipulations, and trained the model. Finally, in Section 4 we present results of the model
on real cases of image duplication and/or manipulation, and show the learned embedding.
2 Related Work
This work is primarily based on [3], [11], and [6].
The classic model for image similarity was proposed in [3] in the context of face verification:
a siamese neural network. This network has two branches that share parameters during training.
Each branch is composed of layers of convolutions and non-linearities followed by fully connected
layers. The two branches are connected at the bottom by the L1 norm. During training, pairs of
images known to be similar or dissimilar are fed to the network, and the loss function is designed
to encourage the network to learn a representation that makes the L1 distance between the two
representations small or large, respectively.
In [11], the authors improved upon the standard siamese network model by adding one extra
branch, thus training on image triplets instead of pairs. A triplet consists of an anchor, a positive
2E.g.: https://ori.hhs.gov/forensic-tools
3The test images were previously described as problematic and either corrected or retracted from the literature.
Sourced from http://retractionwatch.com/ and/or https://pubpeer.com/
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example (“same” or “similar” to the anchor image), and a negative example (“different” from the
anchor). A triplet loss was designed to drive similar images to be nearby, and dissimilar images to
be far apart, encouraging the embedding space to be locally Euclidean. A clever trick that enables
fast convergence is the use of hard negative mining: selecting examples where “different” images
are close according to the current metric, and “similar” images are far apart.
In [6], the authors kept the 2-branch architecture, but used a non-conventional “metric” (possibly
assuming negative values) at the connection of the two branches, with a cross-entropy loss function.
This approach allows for the model to learn a function that gives a binary output, rather than a
distance between images, which has the advantage of not requiring the user to establish a threshold
of proximity for images to be the same, as required in [3] and [11].
For our application, we found the binary output option to be more interesting from a user’s
perspective, since the threshold for “sameness” can be difficult to set properly. However, experi-
ments with the loss function proposed in [6] led us to abandon it due to its instability for images
that are actually the same. We settled with a modification that enforces a threshold of 1, beyond
which images are considered different, and let the network learn the appropriate scaling required
for the metric to comply with such separation. We borrow the triplet loss strategy from [11], for
faster training.
3 Model
We aim to solve the following problem: given two images, I and J , determine if they are the same
or different, where J is considered to be the same as I if it is a manipulated version of I. We
sought to find a solution to this problem in the form of a function f , an image-forensic metric, that
computes a distance between two images, satisfying:
• f(I, J) ≥ 0;
• f(I, J) ≤ 1 when J is a manipulated version of I;
• f(I, J) > 1 when I and J are different images.
3.1 Architecture
We used a triplet network architecture [11], with the 3 branches sharing parameters. Each branch
consisted of 4 convolution layers, each with ReLU non-linearity, followed by 2 fully-connected layers.
We also included a few standard tricks-of-the-trade, such as batch normalization, local response
normalization, and network-in-network layers. The resulting image representation Ci is a vector of
dimension 128. A summary of the model is shown in the left panel of Figure 1 (a). Complete details
are accessible in the source code4. We experimented with a considerable number of variations on
network depth and hyper-parameters, though we did not perform a thorough or automated search
for the optimal architecture.
3.2 Triplet Loss
Let Ci(I) be the representation at the bottom of branch i for image I, i = 0, 1, 2. Our forensic
metric is defined as
4See file Models.py at https://github.com/HMS-IDAC/ImageForensics
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Figure 1: (a) Model details. (b) Model training diagram. (c) Model testing diagram.
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f ij(I, J) =
∑
k
αk|Cik(I)− Cjk(J)| , (1)
where αk are parameters to be learned. Now, with the convention that the anchor images feed
through branch 0, “same” through branch 1, and “different” through branch 2, we define
σs(I, J) = σ(1− f01(I, J)) , (2)
σd(I, J) = σ(1− f12(I, J)) , (3)
where σ() is the sigmoid function. Our triplet loss is then
L(B) = −
∑
(A,S,D)∈B
[log(σs(A,S)) + log(1− σd(A,D))] , (4)
where B is a batch of triplets (A,S,D), i.e., anchor, same, different.
This loss forces σs ≥ 12 (thus f01 ≤ 1), and σd < 12 (thus f12 > 1), therefore imposing a virtual
threshold of 1 as criteria for similarity as measured by f ij .
3.3 Training Procedure
Positive examples of image manipulation corresponding to data confirmed by institutional or regu-
latory bodies as problematic, which may include retracted and or corrected data, are not publicly
available at the scale that would be required to train a high capacity ConvNet. Thus, we ap-
proached this problem by simulating examples of image manipulation to generate a large training
set, and testing on a small set of 54 real-world examples of inappropriately duplicated images in
peer-reviewed publications5.
To guide the generation of simulated data, we first evaluated the most common forms of image
manipulation within our test set. We identified the following operations: identity, rotation, trans-
lation, scale, or perspective transform; local or global histogram adjustment; partial erasing. In
addition, we also accounted for operations that are common in the preparation of images for scien-
tific manuscripts, such as the insertion of text or drawings. Examples of some of these deformations
are shown in Figure 2.
We started by gathering micrographs, mainly6 from the Image and Data Analysis Core at
Harvard Medical School, and from the Broad Bioimage Benchmark Collection7. There are about
20 classes of images, from various cell types and model organisms, including C. elegans, adipocytes,
mouse nuclei, and mouse embryo cells. The data was cropped (with no overlap) in patches of
256 × 256 pixels, totaling 5215 images that were randomly split into training (4000), validation
(500), and test (715) sets8.
5Images were originally identified as candidates for testing through PubPeer [https://pubpeer.com/] and/or
Retraction Watch [http://retractionwatch.com/]. Data were flagged for concern in a prior setting, and described on
the above sites, and/or at the original parent journal as either corrected or retracted from the literature. Images were
then downloaded directly from journal websites (high quality jpeg where available) and/or images were exported as .tif
files directly from downloaded manuscript .pdfs with no additional compression, embedded profile color management,
and/or conversion of colorspace, and resolution was determined automatically. Downloaded images, where needed,
were further parsed into individual .tif panels using Adobe Photoshop versions CS6 and CC.
6One class of images was taken from the NYU Mouse Embryo Tracking Database:
http://celltracking.bio.nyu.edu/
7https://data.broadinstitute.org/bbbc/
8This data is made available at https://hms-idac.github.io/ImageForensics/
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At each training step two distinct batches of n images are sampled from the entire training
set. The first batch is reserved for the “anchor” branch of the 3-way siamese net, and the sec-
ond for the “different” branch. For each anchor image, a corresponding image for the “similar”
branch is obtained by on-the-fly deformation of the anchor. Deformations vary in degree (how
much) and number (how many), according to the following pseudo-code, where rand() is a sam-
ple from the uniform distribution in [0, 1], randreflection() is random reflection, randpptf() a
random perspective transform, randtform() a random similarity transform (rotation, scale, trans-
lation), crop() is a 128×128 centered crop, randgammaadj() is a random gamma adjustment, and
randlocaledit() is a random local edit (change in pixel intensity).
deformation(im):
r = rand()
if r < 0.9:
im1 = randreflection(im) if rand() < 0.5 else im
im2 = randpptf(im1) if rand() < 0.5 else im1
im3 = randtform(im2) if rand() < 0.5 else im2
else:
im3 = im
im4 = crop(im3)
if r < 0.9:
im5 = randgammaadj(im4) if rand() < 0.5 else im4
im6 = randlocaledit(im5) if rand() < 0.5 else im5
else:
im6 = im4
return im6
The “anchor” and “different” images on the triplet are also center-cropped to 128×128 to be of
the same size as the “different” image, which needs cropping to eliminate border effects introduced
by the deformations. Random clutter is added (with certain probability) to all images in the triplet
– it can be either random text or a random rectangle. Details on parameters of each individual
deformation and clutter are in the source code9. Some examples of deformations are shown in
Figure 2.
4 Results and Discussion
Our model reached peak accuracy on the validation set at about 5000 training iterations for a
batch size of 256 images. The following table summarizes the accuracy on the validation and test
sets for synthetic images, as well as the accuracy on a small dataset of real duplications and/or
manipulations, containing 54 cases. Performance on real cases is the average of 10 runs of the
predictor; Figure 3 shows details of such prediction. Notice that the model is consistent on the
errors it makes, and becomes more confident on the answer as the number of training steps increase,
though it makes slightly more errors. This indicates early-stopping might be a good strategy when
deploying the model on real-world cases – though the real-world images dataset is too small to draw
any conclusions.
9See train.py and image distortions.py at https://github.com/HMS-IDAC/ImageForensics
6
original rotation translation clutter
perspective histogram erase combined
Figure 2: Deformations. “clutter” corresponds to the addition of random text and a random box;
“histogram” corresponds to local and global pixel intensity adjustment; “combined” corresponds to
a sample run of the algorithm described in Subsection 3.3.
# training steps acc. valid. acc. test, synth. acc. test, real
∼ 1500 0.96 0.95 0.94
∼ 5000 0.98 0.97 0.92
Unfortunately at this time we are unable to publish real-world example images. Some examples
of synthetic image pairs, along with prediction, are shown in Figure 4. Trained models are available
at the project’s page. Figure 5 shows a snapshot of the PCA of the embeddings of 1024 synthetic
images, as represented by the 128-dimensional output of the CNN. A video of the embedding is
available at https://youtu.be/--cFoKPNMu8
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated a proof-of-concept that siamese networks have the potential to improve
surveillance of the published and in-peer-review literature for duplicated images. This approach
may not prove accurate enough to definitively determine image duplication, but rather could serve
to narrow down the pool of images which are subjected to further review. Surprisingly, we found
that many of the errors in the test set involved histogram/contrast alterations, despite this being
one of the easier cases to spot by the human eye. We added both local intensity and gamma changes
in the training set, and will continue to explore intensity alterations as a way to improve accuracy
of the algorithm (e.g. by adding JPEG compression as one of the manipulations).
One of the main roadblocks to this research is the lack of a public, large-scale database of image
manipulation cases on which to further test the model. The challenge here is not only of generating
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3: 10 runs on real-world test examples after training for 1500 steps (a) and 5000 steps (b).
Squares correspond to pairs of “same” images, circles to “different” – thus all squares (resp. circles)
should be above (resp. below) the horizontal line of likelihood equal to 50 (those that are, are
colored green, those that are not, are colored red). Classes are sorted in the same way for both
plots.
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Correct Predictions Wrong Predictions
Same Same
Same Same
Same Diff
Same Diff
Figure 4: Predictions on pairs of images from our synthetic dataset. For correct predictions, we are
just showing “same” since the goal is candidate detection and we care less about when the model
says that images are different (in most cases, they will be very different). For wrong predictions we
are showing both “same” and “diff” cases to see what types of errors the model makes.
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one such dataset, but also of securing the proper permissions to release the data, given the legal
issues involved. We are continually expanding our dataset and will make it available as soon as
possible.
Another interesting topic of future research would be to implement Grad-CAM [12] style network
inspection to gather information for why the network thinks two images are similar, when it finds
them to be.
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